- Title:
- Implementing NORAD, 1956-1962; the bureaucratic tug of war for access and influence.
- Creator:
- Allin, Robert Douglas
- Date Created:
- 1998
- Degree Awarded:
- Master of Arts
- Subjects:
- North American Air Defense Command Military Relations United States United States Military Relations Politics And Government 1957-1963
- Geographical Focus:
- Canada US
- Supporting Materials:
- n/a
- Description:
- This thesis is an analysis of the conceptions, misconceptions and intrigues which underpinned the adoption and execution of the North American Air Defence Command by the Canadian government. The study begins in December 1956, when a proposal to formally integrate the air defences of the continent under a single American commander was introduced as a serious topic for consideration within various departments of the Canadian government, and ends in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis. Throughout the period in question, the Departments of External Affairs, National Defence and the Privy Council Office all played crucial parts in managing the NORAD file. Differences between External and National Defence over the proper interpretation of the accord led not only to strained interdepartmental relations, but also to the political embarrassment of the Diefenbaker government in 1958 and to unrealistic expectations of American consultation during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.
Source
- Preferred Citation:
- Allin, Robert Douglas. 1998. "Implementing NORAD, 1956-1962; the bureaucratic tug of war for access and influence.", Department of History, Carleton University
- Link to this page:
- https://cuhistory.github.io/grads/items/hist_202.html
Rights
- Rights:
- Copyright the author, all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.